“And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.”
John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963
Two Architectures, Not One
Russia has called for a new European security architecture for nearly two decades. President Putin made the case at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007.[1] President Medvedev proposed a European Security Treaty in 2008.[2] Moscow tabled draft treaties with the United States and with NATO in December 2021, and in June 2024 Putin proposed a new architecture of equal and indivisible security for Eurasia.[3] In November 2026 the Russian Foreign Ministry declared that the crisis in European security had drawn a line under the previous security system in Europe as far as Russia is concerned.[4] The Western reply has been consistent. Europe already has a security architecture, the reply goes, and that architecture has broken down only because Russia violated it. A British statement to the OSCE Permanent Council in June 2026 put the point succinctly: Russia continues to call for a new security architecture, “but we already have one.”[5]
I argue that the British account is false and that Russia is correct to call for a new architecture. The error in the account offered by London, Brussels and Berlin lies in speaking of a single architecture. Europe has had two security architectures since the 1970s, built on different and incompatible premises. The first is the architecture of the Conference, later the Organization, for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, then OSCE). It includes every state from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It rests on the principle that the security of each state depends on the security of all, which is the Golden Rule applied to relations among states: do not seek your own security in ways that diminish the security of your neighbor. The second is the architecture of NATO, a U.S.-led alliance grounded in the premise that European security comes from NATO’s geopolitical predominance and military superiority over Russia. The OSCE architecture is an architecture of international law and mutual restraint. The NATO architecture, as it has operated since the 1990s, is an architecture of Western power, and it has brought war.
What has broken down in Europe is not the OSCE architecture but the Western choice of NATO over the OSCE. Since the early 1990s, the United States and its European allies have paid lip service at most to the OSCE while building the NATO architecture in practice. The two tracks collided in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. Europe now seeks to continue on the NATO track, with an open-ended arms race and the risk of direct war with a nuclear superpower. This course will fail militarily and politically, not least because the United States will not support it. Europe should instead return to the OSCE track, which delivered the peaceful end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany.
The First Track: From Ostpolitik to the OSCE
The first track began with the Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt and his adviser Egon Bahr understood that the Federal Republic could achieve neither security nor eventual reunification by confronting the Soviet Union, but only through what Bahr called “change through rapprochement.”[6] The Moscow Treaty of August 1970 and the Warsaw Treaty of December 1970 recognized Europe’s postwar borders and renounced the use of force. The Basic Treaty of December 1972 normalized relations between the two German states. These agreements did not end the division of Europe, but they built the trust on which every later achievement depended.
Ostpolitik led directly to the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975, signed by thirty-five states, including the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and every European state except Albania. The Final Act set out ten principles that remain the most complete statement of a European security order: sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights, the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, cooperation among states, and the fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.[7] The Final Act was not an alliance. It was an agreement among adversaries on how to live together, and its human rights provisions, far from weakening détente, gave reformers in the East a standard to which they could hold their own governments.
Arms control accompanied Helsinki. The ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972 accepted mutual vulnerability as the basis of strategic stability. The INF Treaty of December 1987, negotiated by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, eliminated an entire class of nuclear missiles from Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 1990 placed ceilings on tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and other heavy equipment from the Atlantic to the Urals. Each of these treaties bound both sides equally, and each made both sides safer. None of them depended on one side prevailing over the other.
German reunification was the culmination of the first track. On February 9, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev that NATO’s jurisdiction would not move “one inch eastward” if a reunified Germany remained in NATO. Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher and other Western leaders gave similar assurances in the following months, as the declassified record assembled by the National Security Archive makes clear.[8] The Two-plus-Four Treaty of September 1990 restored Germany’s full sovereignty, and Soviet forces withdrew peacefully from Central Europe. In November 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe declared that the era of confrontation and division had ended and affirmed that security is indivisible, with the security of every participating state inseparably linked to that of all the others.[9]
The CSCE became the OSCE at the Budapest summit of December 1994. At the Istanbul summit of November 1999, the participating states adopted the Charter for European Security, in which each state pledged that it will not strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other states. The Charter also declared that no state, group of states or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.[10] The Astana Commemorative Declaration of 2010 reaffirmed these commitments.[11] Western governments now stress that the Istanbul Charter also affirmed the right of each state to choose its security arrangements, including alliances. That is true, but the two provisions were adopted in the same paragraph and must be read together. The right to join an alliance is bounded by the obligation not to strengthen one’s own security at the expense of others. That is the meaning of indivisible security.
The Second Track: From NATO Enlargement to War
The second track began in 1993 and 1994, when the Clinton administration decided to enlarge NATO eastward, notwithstanding the explicit assurances of no NATO enlargement given by the U.S. and Germany in 1990.[12] George Kennan, the architect of containment, warned in February 1997 that NATO expansion would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”[13] Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO in March 1999. In the same month NATO began a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia without authorization from the UN Security Council, demonstrating to Moscow that the NATO alliance was not merely defensive. In 2002 the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty, gravely undermining the nuclear arms control architecture. In 2004 seven more states were admitted to NATO, including the three Baltic states, bringing the alliance to Russia’s border near St. Petersburg.
It is often said in reply that the Central European states sought NATO membership of their own accord. That is true, but the decision to admit them belonged solely to NATO, and NATO’s leading members, the United States and Germany above all, were bound by the assurances they had given Gorbachev in 1990 as the basis of German reunification.[14] Washington and Bonn should have honored those assurances while offering Central Europe security through the OSCE and prosperity through membership in the European Union. They chose instead to extend the NATO alliance.
At the Bucharest summit of April 2008, NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.”[15] The U.S. ambassador in Moscow, William Burns, had cabled Washington two months earlier that Ukrainian entry into NATO was the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite, not only for Putin.[16] The warning was ignored. Four months after Bucharest, Georgia, encouraged by its expectation of Western backing, launched an assault on Tskhinvali in South Ossetia, and Russia responded with force. The fact-finding mission commissioned by the European Union, led by the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, concluded in September 2009 that the war began with the Georgian attack.[17]
Ukraine had adopted a law on non-bloc status in 2010 under President Yanukovych.[18] In early February 2014, an intercepted telephone call became public in which Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and the U.S. ambassador in Kyiv, Geoffrey Pyatt, discussed who should and should not serve in the next Ukrainian government.[19] On February 21, 2014, Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition leaders, witnessed on behalf of the European Union by the foreign ministers of Germany and Poland and a senior French diplomat, providing for a government of national unity, constitutional reform and early presidential elections.[20] The next day the agreement was violently overturned. Armed groups took control of government buildings, and Yanukovych left Kyiv. With armed paramilitaries in control of the capital, the Rada adopted a resolution declaring that the president had “self-withdrawn” from his constitutional duties, a ground for removal that does not exist in the constitution. The resolution passed with 328 votes, short of the three-quarters majority that the constitution requires for removal, and without following the constitution’s impeachment procedure.[21] Yanukovych did not resign, and he has denied ever doing so. The fall of Yanukovych was an unconstitutional transfer of power actively supported by the United States and carried out in violation of an agreement that Europe itself had witnessed.
In response, Russia annexed Crimea, and war broke out in the Donbas. The annexation of Crimea was taken in part to ensure that Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol would not fall into NATO hands. The Minsk II agreement of February 2015, negotiated by Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine and endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2202, offered a path to peace through autonomy for the Donbas within Ukraine.[22] Kyiv never implemented it, and its Western backers did not press it to do so. In December 2022, former Chancellor Angela Merkel told Die Zeit that the Minsk agreement had been an attempt to give Ukraine time to grow stronger, and former President François Hollande soon said much the same.[23]
In December 2021, Russia proposed draft treaties to the United States and NATO that centered on ending NATO’s eastward enlargement. I personally encouraged the White House to agree to Russia’s call for an end to NATO’s eastward enlargement. Instead, the Biden Administration replied in January 2022 that it would not negotiate on NATO’s open door.[24] The war escalated in February 2022 with Russia’s invasion. Within days, and then over the following weeks, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators meeting in Belarus and then Istanbul came close to an agreement based on Ukrainian neutrality. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who mediated in those weeks, later said that the Western powers blocked the effort, and Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Davyd Arakhamia, said in November 2023 that Russia’s main goal had been Ukraine’s neutrality and that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson had advised Kyiv to keep fighting.[25] Hundreds of thousands of casualties have followed.
Western governments argue that Russia itself destroyed the Helsinki order in 2014 and 2022. The chronology tells a different story. Russia acted in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 only after the U.S.-backed overthrow of Ukraine’s elected president, itself a violation of the Final Act’s principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Russia escalated in February 2022 only after Kyiv had failed for seven years to implement Minsk II, after Washington refused in late 2021 and January 2022 to negotiate on NATO enlargement, and as Kyiv continued its attacks on the Donbas, with OSCE monitors recording a sharp rise in ceasefire violations along the line of contact in mid-February 2022.[26] Even then, Russia’s limited aim was to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table to agree to neutrality, and Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Belarus on February 28, just four days after the operation began. It was the United States, with Britain, that killed that diplomacy in April 2022 by torpedoing the Istanbul agreement.
The U.S. intelligence services were active throughout. The CIA’s involvement with Ukrainian nationalist networks dates back to covert operations against the Soviet Union in the late 1940s and 1950s, now documented in declassified records.[27] After 2014 the CIA built a network of secret bases in Ukraine along the Russian border and trained Ukrainian intelligence units, as The New York Times reported in February 2024.[28] At each juncture where diplomacy offered an exit, the security apparatus in Washington pushed instead for deeper military integration of Ukraine with the West. Meanwhile, the arms control framework was dismantled piece by piece. NATO members declined to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty of 1999, and Russia suspended its participation in the CFE in 2007 and withdrew in 2023. The United States withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 and from the Open Skies Treaty in 2020. New START reached its expiration in February 2026 with no successor treaty in place. In July 2024, the United States and Germany announced the planned deployment of long-range U.S. missiles in Germany beginning in 2026.[29]
Why the NATO Architecture Fails
The NATO architecture is fundamentally flawed because it is a U.S. hegemonic regime rather than an inclusive security regime. An alliance that designates an adversary cannot provide security to that adversary, and an adversary that feels insecure will respond in ways that make the alliance feel insecure in turn. The security dilemma is well understood in the theory and practice of international relations. The OSCE architecture was designed to escape it. The NATO architecture, extended to Russia’s borders, intensified it.
The hegemonic character of the NATO architecture follows from the strategic aims of its leading member. The draft U.S. Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 stated the goal of preventing the emergence of any rival power in Europe or Asia.[30] Zbigniew Brzezinski, in The Grand Chessboard in 1997, described Ukraine as a geopolitical pivot without which Russia would cease to be a Eurasian empire.[31] NATO enlargement served a project to weaken Russia, and in Brzezinski’s own proposal, to see it become a loose confederation of a European Russia, a Siberian republic and a Far Eastern republic.[32] The alliance’s record outside its own territory, in Serbia in 1999, in Afghanistan for twenty years, and in Libya in 2011, where a UN mandate to protect civilians was turned into a campaign of regime change, confirmed to Moscow that the alliance was an instrument of U.S. power projection rather than a purely defensive pact.[33]
A hegemonic regime also subordinates the interests of its own smaller members. Europe has paid heavily for the NATO track. It has lost access to low-cost Russian energy, suffered a sharp rise in industrial costs, especially in Germany, and committed itself to military spending at levels that will crowd out investment in the green and digital transformations on which its prosperity depends. European governments have largely ceded the conduct of diplomacy with Russia to Washington, even as U.S. priorities shift elsewhere. Europe has gained neither security nor strategic autonomy by following the NATO track. It has gained a war on its territory and a long-term confrontation with its largest neighbor.
Principles for a Restored OSCE Order
Europe should revert to the OSCE track. This does not require inventing new principles. The principles already exist in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the Istanbul Charter. What is required is that the participating states, and above all the United States and the NATO members, act on them. Five principles should guide the effort.
The first is a new Concert of Europe. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 created a system of regular consultation among the great powers, and at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 the defeated France was readmitted as a full member of the Concert. Europe then avoided a general war among all the great powers for nearly a century, though not without limited wars.[34] The lesson of 1818 is that lasting peace requires including the former adversary, not isolating it. A modern concert should bring together, within the OSCE framework, the European Union, Russia, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the United States, meeting regularly at the level of leaders to address crises before they escalate. The OSCE has not held a summit since Astana in 2010. A summit to launch negotiations on a European security treaty should take place in 2027.
The second principle is indivisible security, made operational rather than rhetorical. In practice it means an end to NATO’s eastward enlargement, the permanent neutrality of Ukraine on the model of Austria’s neutrality of 1955, and mutual restraint in the stationing of forces, bases and missile systems near the borders of the other side.[35] These obligations should bind both sides. Russia should accept the corresponding limits on its own deployments, including in Belarus and Kaliningrad, under verification by the OSCE.
The third principle is sovereignty as the Helsinki Final Act defines it, combining territorial integrity with non-intervention in internal affairs. Russia would respect the sovereignty and borders of its neighbors under the terms of an agreed settlement, and the neighbors would respect Russia’s sovereignty as well. The United States and Europe must end the practice of regime-change operations, covert support for opposition movements, and the use of nongovernmental fronts to reshape the politics of states on Russia’s periphery and inside Russia. The protection of national minorities, including Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states and Ukraine, should be entrusted to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and to European legal standards that apply equally to all.
The fourth principle is arms control. The participating states should negotiate a ban on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe to replace the lost INF Treaty, a successor to the CFE Treaty with zonal limits on forces near borders, the restoration of the Open Skies regime, and a modernized Vienna Document on the notification and observation of military exercises.[36] The United States and Russia, which together hold the great majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, should negotiate a successor to New START without delay. Arms control is the practical form of indivisible security, because it makes each side’s restraint visible and verifiable to the other.
The fifth principle concerns the Monroe Doctrine, or more precisely the end of double standards. Since 1823 the United States has declared the Western Hemisphere off limits to intervention by outside powers.[37] It enforced the doctrine at the risk of nuclear war in October 1962, when the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba. The National Security Strategy of December 2025 went further and proclaimed a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.[38] The United States would never accept Russian or Chinese bases in Mexico, Canada or Cuba. Indivisible security asks only that the United States extend to Russia the principle that it claims for itself. Great powers have no right to a sphere of influence over their neighbors, but they do have the right to a sphere of security, in which hostile military infrastructure is not placed on their borders. Every great power seeks the same, and a stable European order must recognize it.
A Word to the Baltic States and Poland
The governments of the Baltic states and Poland have been the most forceful advocates of the NATO track, and their fears are rooted in a painful history of partition, occupation and deportation. Yet their strategy rests on a mistaken premise, namely that the United States will defend them in all circumstances. The United States will not save Eastern Europe from its own Russophobia. The U.S. political focus is turning inward, and Washington has told Europe that it must take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits each ally to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,” which leaves each ally to decide its own response rather than obliging it to go to war.[39] No American president will risk New York or Chicago for the Baltic states or Ukraine if those countries do not try harder to cooperate with Russia. To base national security on the opposite assumption is to gamble the region’s survival on the promises of a distant power whose interests increasingly lie elsewhere.
The correct choice is to get along with one’s neighbor, and history shows that this is possible. Finland fought the Soviet Union twice between 1939 and 1944, yet from 1948 until its accession to NATO in 2023 it pursued a policy of neutrality and careful neighborly relations with Moscow.[40] During those decades Finland became one of the most prosperous and secure democracies in the world. Austria followed a similar course after 1955. The Baltic states themselves enjoyed extensive trade and transit with Russia for much of the period after independence, which Moscow recognized in September 1991.[41] Russia has made no territorial claim on them. Their security would be best served by an OSCE framework in which minority rights are protected under common European standards, borders are mutually guaranteed, and military deployments on both sides of the border are limited and verified.
Poland’s history carries a similar lesson. Poland’s greatest catastrophes occurred when the great powers on either side of it went to war or divided it between them. Poland’s deepest interest is therefore not to serve as the forward base of one great power against another, but to help ensure that its neighbors do not clash at all. Warsaw could become a leading voice for a European settlement that includes Russia, as Bonn was under Brandt, rather than a leading voice for indefinite confrontation. Poles should also recall, as I know first-hand from my work in Poland in 1989, that Gorbachev facilitated Poland’s peaceful transition to democracy that year and sought good relations with Poland as a neighbor.[42]
Conclusion
Europe does not lack a security architecture. It has two that are in conflict, and Europe has chosen the wrong one. The OSCE track, from Ostpolitik through Helsinki, arms control, German reunification and the Charter of Paris, ended the Cold War peacefully and brought Europe the greatest degree of security it had known in the twentieth century. The NATO track, from the decision to enlarge through Bucharest, Georgia, the Maidan, the abandonment of Minsk II and the collapse of the Istanbul negotiations, has brought Europe back to war. Russia is right to call for a new architecture, and the right foundation for it is the one Europe already agreed to in Helsinki Final Act, Charter of Paris (1990) and Charter for European Security (Istanbul, 1999). The year 2025 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Europe should honor that anniversary not with commemorations but by convening an OSCE summit, led by Europeans rather than by Washington, to negotiate a treaty of indivisible security that includes Russia. That is the path to peace on the continent, and it is the path that Europe itself once chose.
[1]Vladimir Putin, Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, February 10, 2007.
[2]Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, Berlin, June 5, 2008; the Russian draft of the European Security Treaty was published by the Kremlin on November 29, 2009.
[3]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” and “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” draft texts published December 17, 2021; Vladimir Putin, Address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, June 14, 2024.
[4]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, material on the efforts of the USSR and Russia to establish a system of European security, as reported by Tasnim News Agency, November 7, 2026.
[5]United Kingdom, Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council on Russia’s war against Ukraine, Vienna, June 25, 2026.
[6]Egon Bahr, “Wandel durch Annäherung,” address at the Evangelische Akademie Tutzing, July 15, 1963.
[7]Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, August 1, 1975, “Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.”
[8]Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 613, December 12, 2017.
[9]Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, November 21, 1990.
[10]Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 19, 1999, paragraph 8.
[11]Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community, Astana, December 3, 2010.
[12]On the Clinton administration’s decision, see James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
[13]George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” The New York Times, February 5, 1997.
[14]Savranskaya and Blanton, “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard.”
[15]NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, April 3, 2008, paragraph 23.
[16]U.S. Embassy Moscow, cable 08MOSCOW265, “Nyet Means Nyet: Russia’s NATO Enlargement Redlines,” February 1, 2008; William J. Burns, The Back Channel (New York: Random House, 2019).
[17]Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. I (Brussels: Council of the European Union, September 2009).
[18]Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy,” July 1, 2010.
[19]“Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call,” BBC News, February 7, 2014.
[20]“Agreement on the Settlement of the Political Crisis in Ukraine,” Kyiv, February 21, 2014, witnessed by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Radosław Sikorski and Eric Fournier, Director for Continental Europe at the French Foreign Ministry. Russia’s envoy, Vladimir Lukin, took part in the negotiations but did not sign.
[21]Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 757-VII, “On Self-Withdrawal of the President of Ukraine from Performing His Constitutional Duties and Setting Early Elections of the President of Ukraine,” February 22, 2014; Constitution of Ukraine, Articles 108–112, under which removal by impeachment requires at least three-quarters (338) of the Rada’s 450 members, after review by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.
[22]UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015), February 17, 2015, endorsing the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” of February 12, 2015.
[23]Angela Merkel, interview in Die Zeit, December 7, 2022; François Hollande, interview with The Kyiv Independent, December 28, 2022.
[24]The written U.S. and NATO replies of January 26, 2022 were published by El País on February 2, 2022.
[25]Naftali Bennett, video interview released February 4, 2023; Davyd Arakhamia, interview on the 1+1 television channel, November 24, 2023. On Johnson’s visit to Kyiv on April 9, 2022, see Roman Romaniuk, “From Zelenskyy’s ‘Surrender’ to Putin’s Surrender: How the Negotiations with Russia Are Going,” Ukrainska Pravda, May 5, 2022.
[26]OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Daily Reports, February 18–22, 2022.
[27]Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Archives, 2010), chapter on the CIA’s Ukrainian operations (AERODYNAMIC).
[28]Adam Entous and Michael Schwirtz, “The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin,” The New York Times, February 25, 2024.
[29]The White House, “Joint Statement from the United States and Germany on Long-Range Fires Deployment in Germany,” July 10, 2024.
[30]Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” The New York Times, March 8, 1992, reporting the leaked draft Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1994–1999.
[31]Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
[32]Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997); Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard.
[33]UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), March 17, 2011.
[34]Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
[35]Austria’s neutrality was declared in the Federal Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria of October 26, 1955, following the Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955 and the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955.
[36]Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, November 30, 2011.
[37]James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823.
[38]The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2025.
[39]North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, April 4, 1949, Article 5.
[40]Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union, Moscow, April 6, 1948.
[41]The USSR State Council recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on September 6, 1991.
[42]In August 1989, Gorbachev urged the Polish communist leadership to join the Solidarity-led government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki; see “Gorbachev Urges Polish Communists to Join Solidarity Coalition,” Washington Post, August 23, 1989.
